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Abstract
Objective—Following cigarette excise tax increases, smokers may use cigarette price 
minimization strategies to continue their usual cigarette consumption rather than reducing 
consumption or quitting. This reduces the public health benefits of the tax increase. This paper 
estimates the price reductions for a wide-range of strategies, compensating for overlapping 
strategies.
Method—We performed regression analysis on the 2009–2010 National Adult Tobacco Survey 
(N = 13,394) to explore price reductions that smokers in the United States obtained from 
purchasing cigarettes. We examined five cigarette price minimization strategies: 1) purchasing 
discount brand cigarettes, 2) using price promotions, 3) purchasing cartons, 4) purchasing on 
Indian reservations, and 5) purchasing online. Price reductions from these strategies were 
estimated jointly to compensate for overlapping strategies.
Results—Each strategy provided price reductions between 26 and 99 cents per pack. Combined 
price reductions were possible. Additionally, price promotions were used with regular brands to 
obtain larger price reductions than when price promotions were used with generic brands.
Conclusion—Smokers can realize large price reductions from price minimization strategies, and 
there are many strategies available. Policymakers and public health officials should be aware of 
the extent that these strategies can reduce cigarette prices.
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Introduction
Higher cigarette prices decrease cigarette consumption and smoking prevalence (Chaloupka 
et al., 2011; Hopkins et al., 2001; Institute of Medicine, 2007; Task Force on Community 
Preventive Services, 2001; USDHHS, 2000, 2012). However, not all smokers respond to 
price increases by reducing consumption or quitting. Some smokers sustain their use by 
either using price minimization strategies, or paying the higher prices (Choi et al., 2012; 
DeCicca et al., 2010; Frieden et al., 2005; Goolsbee et al., 2010; Hyland et al., 2004, 2005, 
2006; Licht et al., 2011a,b; White et al., 2005; Xu et al., 2013). A majority of United States 
smokers use price minimization strategies to obtain substantial price reductions (Xu et al., 
2013). These strategies include purchasing discount brands, purchasing cigarettes by the 
carton, using coupons or other price promotions, purchasing cigarettes online, and 
purchasing cigarettes from no- or low-tax sources (e.g. from lower-tax states, municipalities, 
or black markets). In the United States, purchasing cigarettes on Indian reservations is 
another common strategy for obtaining reduced price cigarettes because taxes are often 
lower on these reservations (Hyland et al., 2004, 2005).
Tobacco companies are strategic when offering price promotions, such as providing coupons 
to target populations. Evidence suggests that young adults are more frequently targeted for 
these promotions (Choi et al., 2013). One study by Sfekas and Lillard (2013) suggests that 
cigarette brands with low market share target younger individuals with the price promotions 
of free packs of cigarettes and coupons, with the goal of encouraging brand switching. 
Major cigarette brands, on the other hand, target the price promotion of free packs of 
cigarettes to older smokers to encourage them to continue purchasing the major brand and to 
discourage cigarette quitting (Sfekas and Lillard, 2013). Given cigarette companies' ability 
to target price promotions such as coupons and free packs of cigarettes to specific types of 
individuals, including individuals with a higher propensity to quit smoking, this strategy is 
of particular interest in tobacco control regulatory efforts.
In this study, we estimate the average per pack price reduction that can be attributed to 
different purchasing strategies. We performed regression analysis to account for overlapping 
price reductions. Except for one 2006–2007 study with limited strategies (Pesko et al., 
2013), this approach has not been used in other studies of cigarette price reductions 
(DeCicca et al., 2010; Hyland et al., 2004; Licht et al., 2011a; White et al., 2005; Xu et al., 
2013). We also focus on the strategy of price promotions by investigating if individuals 
receive differential price reductions from this strategy depending on cigarette brand.
Methods
We used the nationally representative 2009–2010 National Adult Tobacco Survey (NATS) 
to evaluate the price reduction associated with each price minimization strategy while 
simultaneously controlling for other strategies, smokers' socio-demographic characteristics, 
smoking behaviors, and other residence factors. NATS is a stratified, national, landline and 
cellular phone-based cross-sectional survey of non-institutionalized adults ≥18 years old. 
Informed consent was obtained from all respondents (N = 118,581) and cell phone 
Pesko et al. Page 2
Prev Med. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 October 01.
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
respondents were offered an incentive for participation. Respondents were interviewed 
between October 2009 and June 2010. Additional information about the NATS survey is 
available online (http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/surveys/nats/pdfs/
methodology-report.pdf).
We excluded non-smokers (86.1% of the sample, N = 102,039), smokers who did not 
provide price paid for the last pack or carton of cigarettes (N = 1243), smokers providing 
price paid below the federal excise tax of $1.01 (N = 26), smokers providing price paid 
greater than $16 (N = 4), and smokers who did not report if they used a special promotion at 
last purchase or if they had purchased cigarettes online during the past year (N = 37). Our 
sample consists of current smokers who smoked at least 100 cigarettes in their entire life and 
smoked within the past 30 days.
In total, 15,232 current smokers were identified, and among them, 13,394 without any 
missing values were used in our complete case analysis. We also performed sensitivity 
analysis using the full sample of current smokers.
Using the survey responses, we identified respondents engaging in any of the five cigarette 
price-minimization activities: 1) made their most recent cigarette purchase by the carton 
rather than by the pack, 2) took advantage of a price promotion (coupon, rebates, buy 1 get 1 
free, 2 for 1, or any other special promotions) on their most recent purchase, 3) purchased 
cigarettes on an Indian reservation during the previous year, 4) mostly smoked generic 
cigarettes during the previous 30 days, or 5) purchased cigarettes over the internet during the 
previous year. We identified use of these strategies from the following questions. If 
individuals reported buying cigarettes for themselves over the past month, they were asked: 
“During the past 30 days, that is, since [DATE FILL], what brand of cigarettes did you buy 
most often?”. Interviewers could check one of 10 regular brands, 6 discount brands, an 
“other” brand option, and an option to indicate not having a preferred brand.1 Reported 
prices for smokers who were missing information on their cigarette brand and those who 
were classified as using “other” cigarette brands were lower than reported prices paid for 
discount brands. All three (discount, other, and missing) are classified as using the generic 
brand price minimization strategy. Alternatively, these brands are regrouped as high market 
share brands and low market share brands, using the identification strategy of Sfekas and 
Lillard (2013), for additional analysis.2
To identify other price minimization strategies, smokers were asked: “The last time you 
bought cigarettes for yourself, did you buy them by the pack or by the carton?”. If 
individuals reported either option, they were asked the price last paid for their usual quantity 
purchased. For individuals reporting that they usually purchase cigarettes by the carton and 
providing a price last paid per carton, we divided this carton price by 10 to obtain a per pack 
price. Smokers were also asked: 1) The last time you bought cigarettes, did you take 
advantage of coupons, rebates, buy 1 get 1 free, 2 for 1, or any other special promotions for 
1The ten regular brands are Camel, Forsyth (private label), Kool, Marlboro, Newport, Pall Mall, Parliament, Salem, Virginia Slims, 
and Winston. The six discount brands are Basic, Doral, GPC, Misty, Sonoma, and USA Gold.
2High market share brands are Marlboro, Newport, and Camel and low market share brands are Kool, Pall Mall, Winston, Salem, 
Parliament, and Virginia Slims. Other brands are Forsyth, Misty, Sonoma, USA Gold, Doral, Basic, and GPC.
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cigarettes?; 2) In the past 12 months, that is, since [DATE FILL], have you bought cigarettes 
over the Internet?; and 3) In the past 12 months, that is, since [DATE FILL], have you 
bought cigarettes on an Indian reservation?
Note that smokers could potentially use zero, one, or multiple strategies. None of the 
strategies supersede another. Smokers practiced zero strategies 44.4% of the time, one 
strategy 37.5% of the time, two strategies 14.5% of the time, and three or more strategies 
3.6% of the time.
Using self-reported strategies practiced, we estimated the following equation:
where i = individual, s = state, t = time, X = socio-demographic characteristics, and ε is the 
error term. To determine the price reduction associated with each strategy, we estimate the 
equation using a linear probability model and we use dependent variables of either 1) price 
paid per pack at last purchase, or 2) the natural log of price paid per pack at last purchase. 
The five cigarette price minimization strategies are jointly included as independent 
variables. Control variables include socio-demographic characteristics, smoking 
characteristics, residence surrounding characteristics, and state and quarter fixed effects (4th 
quarter of 2009, and 1st and 2nd quarters of 2010). We affirmed the association between 
each vector of variables and price using joint F-statistics tests (p < 0.02 for each vector).
Socio-demographic characteristics are gender, race/ethnicity, age, education, annual 
household income, marital status, health insurance status, and employment status. The 
smoking characteristics are number of cigarettes smoked daily and the number of days 
(every day or some day) that the individual has smoked over the past 30 days. Both socio-
demographic and smoking characteristics are included in the regression as control variables 
primarily because they may be correlated with omitted variables that influence both price 
minimization strategies and price paid, such as the use of uncontrolled strategies (e.g. black 
market purchases).
The residence surrounding characteristics are county population density, strength of state 
smoke free air laws, state cigarette excise tax rates, and state average motor gasoline prices 
(to account for travel costs to cheaper cigarette sources).3 These characteristics can 
influence an individuals' decision to smoke and the price they pay for cigarettes, so 
controlling for these is useful to remove confounding that could otherwise impact our 
estimates of the per-pack price reductions attributable to each strategy. Similarly, time-
3Monthly state cigarette excise tax rates were provided by the Tax Burden on Tobacco (Orzechowski and Walker, 2011). Smoke free 
air law data was collected by the ImpacTeen project (http://www.impacteen.org). This data measures the strength of each state's 
restaurant, workplace, and bar smoke-free air laws respectively (on a scale of 0–2, 2 being the strongest restrictions). This information 
is summed to create an index value of between 0 and 6 and matched to the data based on each respondent's state of residence. The 
Census Bureau's July 2009 county population estimates and land area data were used to determine population densities by county. If 
county identifiers were missing in the NATS data, which it was for 4.9% of respondents, then the average population density for 
respondents in the state was used. Finally, motor gasoline prices were merged for the years 2009 and 2010 from the State Energy Data 
System operated by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (http://www.eia.gov/state/seds).
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invariant changes in cigarette prices across states and seasonal changes in cigarette prices 
are removed by the inclusion of state and quarter fixed effects. All statistical analyses used 
population weights provided in the data and standard errors are cluster-corrected at the 
levels of state/sub-state and phone type.
Results
The mean price paid per pack was $5.14. Column 2 of Table 1 provides population weighted 
descriptive statistics for our sample of smokers. Linear probability model results suggest that 
the average per pack price reductions were $0.65 for generic brand purchases, $0.99 for 
carton purchases, $0.26 for price promotions, and $0.40 for purchases on Indian reservations 
(Table 1, Columns 3–4). These price reduction estimates were jointly determined to 
compensate for overlapping strategies. We do not interpret the coefficient on the strategy of 
internet purchase over the past year because of a small sample (1.2% of respondents), and 
we include it in our analysis purely for control purposes.
Smokers practicing multiple strategies can save substantially more; for example, additive 
properties of linear probability models suggest that a purchaser of a carton of discount brand 
cigarettes saves, on average, $1.64 per pack. Conditional on an individual's use of these 
price minimization strategies, additional price reductions were associated with being male, 
White, non-Hispanic, older, lower income, married, and unemployed. Additionally, smoking 
characteristics of smoking on some day (compared to every day) and smoking a higher 
number of cigarettes daily were also associated with additional price reductions.
Our estimate of the price reduction from Indian reservation purchases should be interpreted 
cautiously as the question asks if a purchase has been made on an Indian reservation over 
the past year, a strategy that may or may not have been used at last purchase. To see if the 
non-overlapping time intervals between the Indian reservation strategy and other price 
minimization strategies that are captured by the survey at last purchase affect our price 
reduction estimates, we re-estimated the model not controlling for Indian reservation 
purchases and Internet purchases (another variable that asks about purchasing behavior over 
the past year). The price reductions associated with these three strategies (results available 
upon request) changed by at most 3 cents from our estimates in Table 1, suggesting that the 
price reduction from Indian reservation purchases were independent from the impacts of 
other price minimization strategies that were in different time intervals.
We also log transformed our dependent variable to provide a different interpretation of our 
coefficients, which are now as a percentage of the price paid per pack (Table 1, Columns 5–
6). Linear probability model results of the natural log transformed dependent variable of 
price paid per pack suggests that smokers on average save 16.9% for generic brand 
purchases, 22.6% for carton purchases, 4.9% for price promotions, and 8.2% for purchases 
on Indian reservations.
Table 2 provides results for if individuals receive differential price reductions for using price 
promotions based on usual brand purchased. We find some evidence that individuals 
purchasing brand-name cigarettes realize larger price reductions from price promotions than 
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individuals purchasing generic cigarettes. High or low market share was not predictive of 
differential price reductions from price promotions, although an “other” category, which 
contains several generic brands, was predictive.
We performed several sensitivity analyses to see how our results may be influenced by 
missing data. We first examined missing data for our independent variables by re-estimating 
the model in Table 1 and using categorical variables for any missing data, with the results 
presented in Appendix Table A.1. Price reductions differed by at most 2 cents and none of 
these differences were statistically significant from our estimates in Table 1, suggesting little 
difference in the size of price reductions for individuals with and without complete 
information.
We also examined missing data for the dependent variable of the price paid for the last pack 
of cigarettes. Starting with the sample we used in the complete case analysis, we added back 
906 observations with unknown price information. In Appendix Table A.2, we report that 
these individuals were less likely to be young, Black, Non-Hispanic, and high school 
educated. These individuals were also more likely to report purchasing generic brand 
cigarettes and were less likely to practice the other price minimization strategies. To the 
extent that these individuals with incomplete information obtain different sized price 
reductions than individuals with complete information, this could influence our estimates; 
however, the relatively small number of observations with missing price information (4.9%) 
attenuates the influence of any potential bias.
Discussion
Each cigarette price minimization strategy was associated with significant price reductions. 
The per pack price reductions associated with these strategies ranged from $0.26 for using 
price promotions to as much as $1 for purchasing cigarettes by the carton. The size of these 
price reductions may be increasing with rising cigarette excise taxes: the price reductions for 
carton purchasing were previously estimated at $0.68 in 2006–07 (Pesko et al., 2013) and is 
estimated at $0.99 in this research in 2009–10, during which time 21 states increased their 
cigarette excise taxes at least once and the federal government increased its excise tax from 
$0.33 to $1.01 a pack. Our findings suggest that price-sensitive smokers may have low-
priced alternatives that allow them to continue to purchase cigarettes within their budget 
when facing price increases. Thus, smokers' purchasing behaviors may substantially mitigate 
the effect of increased cigarette excise taxes on retail prices and undermine the positive 
public health impact of price increases.
Because participants' usage of each price minimization strategy can be substantially different 
(Choi et al., 2012; Hyland et al., 2005; White et al., 2005), prohibiting industry promotions 
alone, a widely considered public policy effort, may not be sufficient to uphold the effect of 
cigarette taxes and reduce the prevalence of smoking. For instance, prohibiting industry 
promotion alone is less likely to affect smoking behaviors of price sensitive smoker 
subpopulations, such as users of generic brands or cigarette carton purchasers, who might 
have quit without discount options within their budget. Therefore, comprehensive policy 
efforts are needed to facilitate public health improvements from rising cigarette prices. In 
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addition to prohibiting industry coupons and promotions, other potential strategies that could 
offset the effect of price minimization strategies include setting a high floor price for 
cigarettes and expanding state-level negotiations with Indian reservations on the collection 
of state excise taxes (Chaloupka, 2011; Feighery et al., 2005, 2009; Samuel et al., 2012; 
Tynan et al., 2013).
This study has at least four limitations that were not discussed previously. First, 18.2% of 
NATS smokers were not asked whether they had purchased cigarettes on an Indian 
reservation, mostly due to an approval delay in the first two months of the survey. Second, 
the NATS did not include all possible price minimization behaviors used by smokers, such 
as purchases from no- or lower-tax sources besides Indian reservations. The potential impact 
of these uncontrolled strategies is at least partly mitigated by including smokers' socio-
demographic characteristics and residence contextual variables, which may be correlated 
with unobserved use of strategies. Additionally, like other surveys, the information collected 
is subject to recall bias when respondents are asked to recall past strategies and price paid. 
However, asking individuals about the price that they paid for their last purchase of 
cigarettes should mitigate recall bias. Additionally, the average of self-reported prices per 
pack in the 2009–2010 NATS was very consistent with the corresponding 2009 national 
average price reported in the Tax Burden on Tobacco (TBOT) (Xu et al., 2013). Fourth, the 
data was collected three years ago and the industry is constantly evolving its strategies, so 
the size of these price reductions may have changed over time.
Conclusion
Understanding the extent to which price minimization strategies dilute the price paid for 
cigarettes is important for informing tobacco control efforts on how cigarette taxes can be 
partially offset or completely avoided through these strategies. Cigarette price minimization 
strategies result in large price reductions, which can be compounded when individuals 
practice multiple strategies. These price reductions can mitigate the impact that cigarette 
excise tax increases would otherwise have on reducing cigarette consumption and increasing 
cessation. We recommend further research in this area, as well as research on how price 
promotions are targeted to vulnerable populations.
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Appendix A
Appendix Table A.1
Sensitivity analysis of Table 1, using missing data categories.a,b
Dependent variable: Price per pack (in cents) Natural log of price per pack
Weighted means: 514 6.2
N: 15,232 15,232
R-squared: 0.561 0.515
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Weighted means Coefficient (margin) 95% CI Coefficient (percent) 95% CI
Price minimization strategiesc
Generic brands 25.0 −67.6*** −76.0, −59.2 −17.7*** −19.7, −15.6
Cartons 24.1 −98.2*** −106.2, −90.2 −22.5*** −24.5, −20.5
Price promotionsd 19.7 −27.3*** −34.8, −19.8 −5.3*** −6.9, −3.6
Indian reservations 7.2 −39.8*** −53.4, −26.2 −8.1*** −11.0, −5.2
Internet purchasee 1.2 −59.8** −98.5, −21.2 −14.0** −23.0, −5.0
Gender
Male (Ref) 55.4 0.0 0.0, 0.0 0.0 0.0, 0.0
Female 44.4 8.7** 2.7, 14.8 2.2** 0.9, 3.6
Other, missing 0.2 182.5 −18.2, 383.1 27.0* 4.2, 49.7
Race/ethnicity
White, non-Hispanic (Ref) 68.8 0.0 0.0, 0.0 0.0 0.0, 0.0
Black, non-Hispanic 12.7 24.2*** 13.4, 35.1 4.2*** 1.9, 6.5
Asian, non-Hispanic 1.0 32.7* 1.6, 63.8 5.8* 0.5, 11.0
Native American, non-Hispanic 2.9 11.4 −5.3, 28.0 1.4 −1.7, 4.6
Hispanic 11.6 16.5* 3.1, 30.0 2.7 −0.0, 5.4
Other, multiracial 3.1 15.0 −2.5, 32.5 2.4 −1.1, 5.9
Age
18–24 (Ref) 16.1 0.0 0.0, 0.0 0.0 0.0, 0.0
25–44 43.5 −8.5 −18.3, 1.3 −2.0 −4.0, 0.1
45–64 32.9 −18.5*** −28.8, −8.1 −3.3** −5.4, −1.1
≥65 6.5 −12.7 −26.5, 1.1 −1.5 −4.7, 1.6
Missing data 1.0 −28.9 −61.5, 3.7 −4.8 −10.7, 1.0
Education
Some high school (Ref) 23.9 0.0 0.0, 0.0 0.0 0.0, 0.0
High school 37.2 2.6 −6.2, 11.4 0.1 −1.8, 2.0
Some college 29.3 0.5 −8.6, 9.6 −0.4 −2.4, 1.5
College 9.2 12.2* 0.7, 23.6 1.9 −0.4, 4.2
Missing education 0.4 −39.2 −120.9, 42.5 −5.9 −18.1, 6.4
Annual household income, $
<20,000 (Ref) 20.7 0.0 0.0, 0.0 0.0 0.0, 0.0
20,000–29,999 13.3 6.8 −3.5, 17.0 2.7* 0.4, 4.9
30,000–39,999 13.7 9.1 −2.3, 20.4 3.0* 0.3, 5.6
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Dependent variable: Price per pack (in cents) Natural log of price per pack
Weighted means: 514 6.2
N: 15,232 15,232
R-squared: 0.561 0.515
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Weighted means Coefficient (margin) 95% CI Coefficient (percent) 95% CI
40,000–49,999 12.6 20.4*** 9.2, 31.7 5.3*** 2.9, 7.7
50,000–69,999 13.4 21.0*** 9.7, 32.3 5.5*** 3.1, 7.9
70,000–99,999 9.0 34.8*** 22.6, 47.0 8.7*** 6.2, 11.3
100,000–149,999 5.5 39.0*** 23.6, 54.5 9.3*** 6.2, 12.4
≥150,000 2.4 33.9** 12.8, 54.9 8.5*** 4.5, 12.6
Missing data 9.4 13.1 −0.4, 26.6 3.7 0.5, 6.8
Marital status
Married or cohabiraring (Ref) 48.9 0.0 0.0, 0.0 0.0 0.0, 0.0
Widowed, divorced, or 
separated 23.7 8.2
* 0.5, 15.9 1.6 −0.2, 3.3
Never married, not 
cohabitating 26.8 18.7
*** 10.4, 27.1 3.3*** 1.6, 5.1
Other, refused 0.6 3.0 −45.9, 51.8 −3.0 −15.4, 9.4
Health insurance
Yes (Ref) 62.4 0.0 0.0, 0.0 0.0 0.0, 0.0
No 36.9 −0.2 −7.1, 6.7 −0.1 −1.6, 1.4
Don't know, refused 0.7 −27.8 −70.4, 14.9 −5.5 −13.8, 2.8
Employment status
Employed (Ref) 55.6 0.0 0.0, 0.0 0.0 0.0, 0.0
Unemployed 44.2 −11.5*** −18.4, −4.7 −3.0*** −4.5, −1.5
Don't know, refused 0.3 24.4 −19.5, 68.3 6.3 −1.9, 14.5
Cigarette number
<6 (Ref) 25.6 0.0 0.0, 0.0 0.0 0.0, 0.0
6–14 26.1 −9 −18.5, 0.4 −2.1* −4.1, −0.1
>14 46.1 −11.5* −21.3, −1.7 −2.7* −4.8, −0.5
Missing data 2.2 −37.4* −67.1, −7.8 −9.0* −16.6, −1.4
Smoking days
Every (Ref) 77.4 0.0 0.0, 0.0 0.0 0.0, 0.0
Some 22.6 −13.5** −23.4, −3.6 −3.4** −5.6, −1.3
*Significant at 5% level.
**Significant at 1% level.
***Significant at .1% level.
a
The regressions included state fixed effects, quarter fixed effects, county population density, strength of state smoke free 
air laws, state cigarette excise tax rates, motor gasoline prices, and a constant term, but those terms are not reported.
bStatistical significance and confidence intervals are determined using standard errors that are cluster-corrected at the state/
sub-state and phone type level.
cCigarette price minimization strategy estimates are compared to a reference category of non-use of each strategy. 
Statistically significant negative coefficients for the priceminimization strategies suggest that individuals practicing these 
strategies are reducing prices by the amounts given by the coefficients (in cents or as a percent of the price).
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d
Price promotions include coupon, rebates, buy 1 get 1 free, 2 for 1, or any other special promotions.
e
This estimate should be interpreted with caution due to a low sample size.
Appendix Table A.2
Odds ratios of reporting an invalid price per pack of cigarettes.
Dependent variable: Invalid price per pack
Weighted means 4.9%
N 14,300
Coefficient (odds ratio) 95% CI
Price minimization strategies
Generic brands 2.32*** 1.64, 3.26
Cartons 0.70* 0.50, 0.99
Price promotions 0.38*** 0.25, 0.58
Indian reservations 0.39*** 0.23, 0.67
Internet purchase 0.23* 0.07, 0.77
Gender
Male (Ref) 1.00 1.00, 1.00
Female 0.90 0.70, 1.15
Race/ethnicity
White, non-Hispanic (Ref) 1.00 1.00, 1.00
Black, non-Hispanic 0.45** 0.27, 0.74
Asian, non-Hispanic 0.58 0.21, 1.57
Native American, non-Hispanic 0.94 0.50, 1.74
Hispanic 1.02 0.50, 2.08
Other, multiracial 1.22 0.68, 2.19
Age
18–24 (Ref) 1.00 1.00, 1.00
25–44 1.12 0.63, 1.99
45–64 1.79* 1.01, 3.15
≥65 3.33** 1.46, 7.62
Education
Some high school (Ref) 1.00 1.00, 1.00
High school 0.51** 0.33, 0.80
Some college 0.77 0.51, 1.17
College 0.99 0.61, 1.63
Annual household income, $
<20,000 (Ref) 1.00 1.00, 1.00
20,000–29,999 0.81 0.51, 1.31
30,000–39,999 1.09 0.62, 1.95
40,000–49,999 1.07 0.63, 1.83
50,000–69,999 1.18 0.73, 1.91
70,000–99,999 0.87 0.50, 1.52
100,000–149,999 1.01 0.55, 1.84
≥150,000 0.95 0.46, 1.98
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Dependent variable: Invalid price per pack
Weighted means 4.9%
N 14,300
Coefficient (odds ratio) 95% CI
Marital Status
Married or cohabitating (Ref) 1.00 1.00, 1.00
Widowed, divorced, or separated 0.78 0.54, 1.11
Never married, not cohabitating 0.80 0.56, 1.15
Health insurance
Yes (Ref) 1.00 1.00, 1.00
No 0.99 0.73, 1.36
Employment status
Employed (Ref) 1.00 1.00, 1.00
Unemployed 0.86 0.58, 1.28
Cigarette number
<6 (Ref) 1.00 1.00, 1.00
6–14 0.64 0.39, 1.05
>14 0.76 0.39, 1.48
Smoking days
Every (Ref) 1.00 1.00, 1.00
Some 1.41 0.78, 2.55
*Significant at .5 % level.
**Significant at .1 % level.
***Significant at .1 % level.
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Table 1
Average price reduction for price minimization strategies from linear probability model multivariate 
regression analysisa,b.
Dependent variable: Price per pack (in cents) Natural log of price per pack
Weighted means: 514 6.2
N: 13,394 13,394
R-squared: 0.567 0.521
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Weighted means Coefficient (margin) 95% CI Coefficient (percent) 95% CI
Price minimization strategies c
Generic brands 25.1
−65.2*** −73.7, −56.6 −16.9*** −18.9, −14.9
Cartons 24.4
−98.6*** −107.0, −90.3 −22.6*** −24.7, −20.5
Price promotionsd 20.0 −26.4*** −34.2, −18.6 −4.9*** −6.6, −3.3
Indian reservations 7.3
−40.2*** −54.8, −25.5 −8.2*** −11.4, −5.1
Internet purchasee 1.2 −56.7** −95.0, −18.5 −13.4** −21.8, −5.0
Gender
Male (Ref) 55.7 0.0 0.0, 0.0 0.0 0.0, 0.0
Female 44.3 7.6* 1.3, 13.9 2.0** 0.6, 3.4
Race/ethnicity
White, non-Hispanic (Ref) 69.6 0.0 0.0, 0.0 0.0 0.0, 0.0
Black, non-Hispanic 12.4 22.9*** 11.4, 34.5 4.2*** 1.8, 6.6
Asian, non-Hispanic 1.0 32.1 −1.4, 65.5 5.7 −0.0, 11.4
Native American, non-Hispanic 2.8 2.9 −11.5, 17.2 0.2 −3.1, 3.5
Hispanic 11.4 12.2 −2.0, 26.3 1.8 −1.1, 4.7
Other, multiracial 2.9 16.1 −4.3, 36.5 2.1 −1.9, 6.2
Age
18–24 (Ref) 15.0 0.0 0.0, 0.0 0.0 0.0, 0.0
25–44 44.9
−13.2* −23.4, −3.0 −3.2** −5.1, −1.2
45–64 33.7
−22.3*** −33.2, −11.5 −4.5*** −6.6, −2.3
≥65 6.4
−21.4** −35.8, −7.0 −3.7* −6.8, −0.6
Education
Some high school (Ref) 22.6 0.0 0.0, 0.0 0.0 0.0, 0.0
High school 37.6 2.4 −6.8, 11.6 −0.1 −2.1, 1.9
Some college 30.3 −0.7 −10.6, 9.1 −0.7 −2.8, 1.4
College 9.6 6.9 −4.6, 18.5 1.0 −1.4, 3.4
Annual household income, $
<20,000 (Ref) 22.6 0.0 0.0, 0.0 0.0 0.0, 0.0
20,000–29,999 14.7 6.6 −3.7, 16.8 2.6* 0.4, 4.8
30,000–39,999 15.4 8.7 −2.8, 20.2 2.8* 0.2, 5.5
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Dependent variable: Price per pack (in cents) Natural log of price per pack
Weighted means: 514 6.2
N: 13,394 13,394
R-squared: 0.567 0.521
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Weighted means Coefficient (margin) 95% CI Coefficient (percent) 95% CI
40,000–49,999 13.9 20.3*** 9.0, 31.6 5.2*** 2.7, 7.6
50,000–69,999 14.9 20.8*** 9.3, 32.3 5.4*** 2.9, 7.8
70,000–99,999 10.1 36.9*** 24.5, 49.2 9.1*** 6.5, 11.6
100,000–149,999 6.1 40.6*** 24.9, 56.2 9.6*** 6.5, 12.8
≥ 150,000 2.4 39.7*** 21.2, 58.2 9.4*** 5.7, 13.1
Marital status
Married or cohabirating (Ref) 50.0 0.0 0.0, 0.0 0.0 0.0, 0.0
Widowed, divorced, or separated 24.5 9.6* 1.5, 17.8 1.9* 0.1, 3.7
Never married, not cohabirating 25.6 17.7*** 9.1, 26.4 3.2*** 1.5, 4.9
Health insurance status
Yes (Ref) 63.3 0.0 0.0, 0.0 0.0 0.0, 0.0
No 36.7 −1.8 −8.9, 5.4 −0.7 −2.2, 0.9
Employment status
Employed (Ref) 56.7 0.0 0.0, 0.0 0.0 0.0, 0.0
Unemployed 43.3
−9.1* −16.3, −1.9 −2.5** −4.1, −1.0
Cigarette number
<6 (Ref) 25.9 0.0 0.0, 0.0 0.0 0.0, 0.0
6–14 26.4 −6.7 −16.9, 3.4 −1.7 −3.8, 0.5
>14 47.8
−11.8* −22.4, −1.2 −2.6* −5.0, −0.3
Smoking days
Every (Ref) 78.8 0.0 0.0, 0.0 0.0 0.0, 0.0
Some 21.2
−13.4* −24.0, −2.8 −3.4** −5.8, −1.1
*Significant at 5% level.
**Significant at 1% leve.
***Significant at .1% level.
a
The regressions included state fixed effects, quarter fixed effects, county population density, strength of state smoke free air laws, state cigarette 
excise tax rates, motor gasoline prices, and a constant term, but those terms are not reported.
bStatistical significance and confidence intervals are determined using standard errors that are cluster-corrected at the state/sub-state and phone 
type level.
cCigarette price minimization strategy estimates are compared to a reference category of non-use of each strategy. Statistically significant negative 
coefficients for the price minimization strategies suggest that individuals practicing these strategies are reducing prices by the amounts given by the 
coefficients (in cents or as a percent of the price).
d
Price promotions include coupon, rebates, buy 1 get 1 free, 2 for 1, or any other special promotions.
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e
This estimate should be interpreted with caution due to a low sample size.
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Table 2
Price reduction estimates from use of price promotions, interacted with brand and age.a
Dependent variable: Price per pack (in cents)
Weighted means 514
N 13,394
Coefficient (margin) 95% CI
Model #1
Price promotion × regular brand (Ref) 0.0 0.0, 0.0
Price promotion × generic brand 22.9* −0.5, 46.4
Model #2
Price promotion × high market share brand (Ref) 0.0 0.0, 0.0
Price promotion × low market share brand −10.3 −30.3, 9.6
Price promotion × other/missing brand 24.1** 0.5, 47.7
*Significant at 5% level.
**Significant at 1% level.
a
Themodels are estimated identically to the model in Table 1, with the addition of reported interaction terms. All constitutive elements of the 
interaction term are included as standalone variables (Brambor et al., 2006; Braumoeller, 2004).
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